Eva Meijer

and we should view rationality not as something you either have or do not have, but rather as something you can have more or less of.

Defining language as exclusively human is usually interconnected with seeing a clear break between humans and other animals (Aaltola 2013; Derrida 2008, 2009, 2011). This does not refer to a biological (Darwin 1872) or universal (Derrida 2008) truth, but springs from cultural practices in a discourse that sees humans as more important than other animals, and as the standard by which non-human animals are measured (Calarco 2008, 2015; Derrida 2008).

current studies in moral psychology show that much of our moral behavior is habitual and instinctive

Furthermore, using the human norm as the starting point for defining reason and language or for moral consideration is not a neutral step, but is formed by power relations

“The question is not: can they speak, nor can they reason, but: can they suffer?”

The word “animal” categorizes all non-human animals and distances humans from other animals (Derrida 2008, 31).

naturalistic ethic, an empirical refutation of empirical claims stating that other animals are like humans, will not suffice. This would leave the structure of the debate intact, and could lead to measuring the worth of other animals on the basis of their resemblance to humans (Wolfe 2003).

Each individual, human or non-human, belongs to different groups, with regard to gender, age, species, race, and so on.

we are as vulnerable as other animals, and our knowledge is always limited by our sensory mechanisms, ways of being situated socially and politically, or more generally, by our spe

Who speaks, who is heard, and who determines this are important questions in political interspecies interactions.